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Institutional 
elements of a new 
diplomacy for 
development 
(Notes for a book 
of memoirs) 
Diego Cordovez* 
T h e Nor th-South dialogue is current ly passing 
through a prolonged period of stagnation which has 
given rise to some pessimism regarding the possibility 
of securing a change in international economic re-
lations through dialogue and mutual understanding 
between the parties involved. 
While not failing to acknowledge the obstacles 
standing in the way of any action designed to break the 
prevailing deadlock, the author stresses the positive 
effects of this dialogue —both those already achieved 
and those still perhaps to be obtained— and suggests 
the measures that should be taken to get the dialogue 
moving again. 
To begin with, he analyses the main features of the 
new diplomacy for development begun with the first 
UNCTAD session in 1964 and the way in which it has 
evolved —sometimes with frustrations, sometimes 
with achievements— up to the present deadlock situ-
ation. This situation derives from the existence of a 
sharp conflict of interests, either real or perceived, 
between the developed and developing countries, but 
it has also been aggravated by a number of institutional 
problems. Outstanding among these are the prolifer-
ation of organs and forums which are often in conflict 
with each other; the negative effects of the efforts to 
maintain the unity of the two major blocs; the large 
number of participants in the negotiations, and finally 
a certain degree of incoherence in the positions of 
individual governments in different forums. 
In conclusion, the author stresses the need to 
break the current deadlock in the North-South dia-
logue and suggests some measures to that end. 
*Diego Cordovez joined ihe United Nations Secretariat as 
part of the team which, under the direction of Raúl Prebisch, 
organized the first UNCTAD Conference in 1964. After several 
years as Prebisch's special assistant, he served as Secretary of 
the Economic and Social Council and later became Assistant 
Secretary-General in charge of Secretarial Services for 
Economic and Social Matters. On 1 August 1981, Mr. Cor-




The establishment of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
1964 constituted a watershed in the evolution of 
the United Nations system. It marked the be-
ginnings of a new diplomacy in the conduct of 
negotiations on matters concerning develop-
ment. The style and substance of this diplomacy 
have inevitably undergone many changes in the 
intervening years; it is still in the formative stage, 
and suffers from many defects and difficulties. 
And yet, international economic relations and 
multilateral diplomacy itself cannot revert to the 
methods which characterized the pre-UNCTAD 
era. 
What is the nature of the new diplomacy for 
development? 
The new diplomacy is decidedly different 
from traditional bilateral diplomacy, not only in 
that it is principally multilateral in character, but 
also in the sense that the objectives of the various 
actors are ultimately congruent, whether recog-
nized as such or not. It involves, in essence, the 
negot ia t ion by developed and developing 
countries, normally under the auspices of an in-
ternational body, of what may be termed con-
vergent measures, the underlying premise being 
that the developing countries themselves are pri-
marily responsible for their own development 
and that,, guided by considerations of enlight-
ened self-interest, the developed countries adopt 
in that context policy measures designed to 
achieve specific goals. There are widely different 
perceptions of the nature of the measures re-
quired, of the urgency of the convergence, and 
of the short and long-term aims to be achieved. It 
is the function of the new diplomacy to reconcile 
these differences. 
For the purposes of negotiating, the parties 
must first define their objectives and then formu-
late specific measures for achieving those objec-
tives. The speed and flexibility with which the 
seve ra l a c to r s a re able to move t oward 
accommodation depend upon the reactions they 
have to expect in their respective constituencies, 
in the national legislatures, in public opinion, the 
press, producers' associations and business in-
terests. One striking phenomenon that has been 
observed on more than one occasion is that a 
government which wishes to mobilize domestic 
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support for a particular international measure 
deploys vis-à-vis its own constituencies the argu-
ments advanced in support of the same measures 
by "opponent" governments at the negotiating 
table. 
This new diplomacy has been, from the time 
of the 1964 Conference, confrontational. In fact, 
the First UNCTAD witnessed what was perhaps the 
sharpest confrontation between developed and 
developing countries within the United Nations 
system up to that time. It should be noted, 
however, that what happened at UNCTAD I was 
more than a clash over agenda and tactics. The 
a tmosphere may have been tense, but un-
derneath it all there was a general recognition of 
the need for a fresh approach to international 
trade and development issues. Although the 
States of the Third World were vocal and insistent 
in stating their grievances and making their 
claims, the industrial States of the West became 
increasingly sensitive to the fact that the gap in 
living standards between rich and poor nations 
was widening to undesirable and indeed intoler-
able dimensions. 
It could be said, therefore, that the con-
frontational spirit was on the whole salubrious 
and constructive. There was, after all, even on 
the part of the most reluctant participants, the 
desire to create at least institutional forms of 
co-operation. Since then, the pendulum has been 
swinging, albeit slowly, from confrontation to 
accommodation. What is undeniable, however, 
is that the determination of the developing 
countries to assert themselves has imparted a 
new dimension to multilateral diplomacy for 
development. Even the most acid critics of 
North-South negotiations cannot deny that the 
experience of the inter-war period, during which 
international economic relations suffered a 
traumatic upheaval, has been avoided. 
A second element in the new diplomacy is 
that the developing countries display a degree of 
unity without precedent in world affairs. The 
Group of 77 was born during UNCTAD I and 
it bolstered the demands of the developing 
countries with a coherence and solidarity that 
took the industrialized States by surprise. The 
"group system" of negotiation became one of the 
outstanding characteristcs of UNCTAD at an early 
date, and has since spread, with variations, to 
many other multilateral institutions. The group 
system has the obvious advantage of enabling a 
large number of delegations to speak with one 
voice, thereby bringing order to complex 
deliberation and negotiations. Nevertheless, as 
was demonstrated in UNCTAD'S formative period, 
it can lead to the adoption of positions which 
represent either the hardest and most 
intransigent line or the lowest common 
denominator of each group —positions which 
are not always conducive to effective multilateral 
negotiations. 
A corollary of the group system, and an im-
portant third element of the new diplomacy, is 
the "contact group", the quintessence of UNCTAD 
institutions and now a widely emulated mech-
anism. Composed of a small number of key del-
egations which are, as far as possible, repre-
sentative of the larger membership, the contact 
group enables the participants to carry on their 
business with the utmost flexibility in an environ-
ment unhampered by procedural rules, publicity 
and, in practice, deadlines. It enables all sides to 
attempt, with the greatest degree of give-and-
take, to achieve a substantive accommodation of 
policy positions. It improves the chances of con-
ciliation, compromise and consensus. Wherever 
successful, its "open-ended" character —that is, 
the fact that any member of the parent body 
which has set it up can participate in its de-
liberat ions— ensures that the conclusions 
reached are not going to be modified, even if the 
conclusions were reached by a process of reason-
ing that is not fully understood by those who had 
chosen not to participate. This device enabled 
UNCTAD and other United Nations bodies to 
make progress beyond confrontation and, if 
further improved and refined, it can become an 
even more valuable instrument in future nego-
tiations. 
The spread of the new diplomacy coincided 
with the evolution of the United Nations into a 
sprawling network of organizations and pro-
grammes. The establishment of UNCTAD and the 
installation of an activist secretariat at its Geneva 
headquarters can be attributed to the continuing 
refusal of Western and Socialist countries alike to 
countenance either the enlargement of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or its 
transformation into an agency of international 
economic reform and adaptation. 
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UNCTAD was, however, only the first of many 
relatively new United Nations institutions; the 
continuing quest for new and more effective 
forums has greatly added to the difficulties of 
co-ordinating the activities of the different con-
stituents of the United Nations system and has 
manifestly complicated the conduct of the new 
diplomacy. For, inevitably, it was not long before 
the various individual institutions began to dis-
agree as to what their several functions should 
be, and this disagreement led to rivalry and com-
petition. UNCTAD, and in many ways the system as 
a whole, suffered from these jurisdictional dis-
putes. The developed countries tended to regard 
UNCTAD and the United Nations General As-
sembly as forums in which developing countries 
could air their grievances and make their 
The period from the establishment of UNCTAD in 
1964 until the early 1970s was essentially one in 
which the elements of the new diplomacy were 
refined and extended. However, the events of 
this period also illustrate the difficulties inherent 
in adapting the new diplomacy to the conditions 
prevailing in the international system, and in 
using it to achieve new objectives of international 
economic co-operation. There was little nego-
tiation of specific issues. The principal product 
of these years was a large body of hortatory legis-
lation, of "negotiated demands", of what later 
became, in effect, the programme of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). 
One of the positive accomplishments of this 
period is what might be termed the "education" 
of all the actors about the nature and character-
istics of underdevelopment. At the time of 
UNCTAD I, policy makers had only superficial and 
quite elementary notions of the etiology of the 
economic backwardness of certain countries or 
of possible cures. Some few individuals, 
outstanding among whom was UNCTAD'S first 
Secretary-General, Raúl Prebisch, had the 
demands; there might be an exchange oí views as 
to the scope and implications of these demands, 
but the developed countries were not prepared 
to tolerate more than that —neither the United 
Nations nor UNCTAD was to be a forum for 
deciding on action. 
The developing countries disagreed. I n their 
view, the United Nations should be more than a 
debating society; they wanted its institutions to be 
instruments for serious negotiation and for de-
termining action. Essentially, this conflict still 
persists, ECOSOC, for example, is virtually para-
lysed. The conflict has spread and today tends to 
characterize the sharp split in the attitudes of 
developed and developing countries towards the 
uses of the United Nations in the management of 
international economic relations. 
breadth of vision and the depth of knowledge to 
realize what could and should be done to 
promote more rapid and sustained 
development, but in general those demanding 
change were quite vague about both the causes of 
the situation and possible remedies. In the 
industrialized countries there were some 
old-fashioned notions of economic and social 
co-operation based essentially on the traditional 
relationship of donor and recipient of aid. 
The new diplomacy has been a historic learn-
ing experience, and the United Nations has in-
fluenced it decisively. Through its efforts, the 
developing countries learned much about 
their own ills and about remedial measures. In-
deed, all States have benefited from the United 
Nations' research and dialogue. The Organiza-
tion's research budget has been restructured to 
the point where it gives pride of place to studies 
of the needs of the developing countr ies . 
Moreover, some of the structures which have 
evolved within the United Nations system clearly 
had an educational purpose. 
As the developing countries came to un-
II 
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derstand their own needs more fully and to ar-
ticulate their demands more clearly, the de-
veloped countries were obliged to respond in a 
more concrete fashion. By a process which en-
tailed both confrontation and accommodation, 
the demands of the Group of 77 were gradually 
transformed into negotiated objectives. In other 
words, the agenda of the Group of 77 became, in 
effect, the agenda of international co-operation 
for development, even if the industrialized 
countries were unenthusiastic about some ele-
ments of that agenda and had reservations about 
much of it. T h e need to reach some agreement 
—to avoid coming away empty-handed from 
ever more frequent meetings— led to in-
creasingly higher levels of tentative acceptance of 
a common set of agreed aims, even if there was 
not much discussion of practical measures to 
attain them. 
During those early years, the Group of 77 
grew into a moderately effective institution with 
conspicuous limitations. The Group's solidarity 
became increasingly firm on matters of principle 
and on many enconomic issues, provided they 
were broadly defined. Solidarity proved harder 
to achieve on many of the specific issues of trade 
and development. Although the fundamentally 
different interests of the diverse States which 
make up the 77 might reduce the scope for 
common positions on many specific issues, 
solidarity nonetheless remained a dominant pre-
occupation as well as an unquestionable achieve-
ment of the Group. 
Several institutions were created during this 
period. Among these was the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
Its establishment in 1966 had particular signifi-
cance because it provided further evidence of the 
determination by developing countries to es-
tablish congenial insti tutions as well as an 
acknowledgemen t of the need to give in-
dustrialization a prominent place on their agen-
da. UNIDO'S creation is also significant because it 
reflected a shift of some importance in the posi-
tion of the United States, always a pivotal actor in 
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multilateral diplomacy for development. Pre-
viously, the United States had held to the tradi-
tional view of a rough division of labour in the 
world economy, with the South producing raw 
materials and the North turning them into in-
dustrial products, UNIDO did not represent a 
complete reversal of American policy, as reaction 
to the Lima Declaration a decade later was to 
demonstrate, but the United States decision to 
support the creation of UNIDO, urged upon 
President Lyndon Johnson by his Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, a 
lawyer with considerable experience in industrial 
matters, may be seen as one of the early results of 
the new diplomacy. 
Unfortunately, the creation of new in-
stitutions has also had negative effects, the more 
so when those institutions are located in different 
places. It is arguable, for example, that to set up 
UNCTAD in Geneva, with its own technical, di-
plomatic and political constituency, was an 
historic mistake. Conflict and competition de-
veloped between the New York and Geneva 
economic arms of the United Nations, and the 
difficulties encountered by governments in their 
efforts to co-ordinate their policies within these 
multilateral institutions reduced the effective-
ness of the United Nations. 
Nor is it only in the relationship between 
New York and Geneva that the several spokes-
men for each government have failed to consult 
and co-ordinate policy; the picture is further 
clouded by the presence of bodies of the United 
Nations system with related tasks in other in-
ternational centres, notably Vienna and Rome. 
Each of these institutions has its own secretariat, 
its own diplomatic corps, dominated by their own 
influential personalities. Each of these United 
Nations communities has its own ethos, and de-
velops its own distinctive approach to what are 
frequently parallel or even identical issues. 
Levels and sources of representation also differ. 
In the final analysis, the resulting confusion, 
duplication, and seeming diversity can be traced 
to failures of policy co-ordination within national 
capitals. 
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III 
Crisis and dialogue in the 1970s 
Pressure for accommodating the demands of the 
developing countries began to intensify as from 
1973. The new diplomacy, for development, by 
now more refined and well-practiced, was in full 
swing. The recently established United Nations 
institutions had acquired both experience and 
confidence as forums for the conduct of the new 
diplomacy and as the catalysts for moving horta-
tory legislation closer to the stage of implemen-
tation. The oil and food crises which broke 
brusquely on the world in 1973 sharpened to a 
remarkable degree the minds of those engaged 
in discussions on development issues. 
Confronted by the challenge of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
developed countries were compelled to view 
their relations with the South in a new and 
different light. Suddenly interdependence 
acquired a new meaning. The new diplomacy 
had at last brought the entire international 
community to an understanding of the 
complexity and seriousness of development 
issues —and their integration in world affairs. 
Owing to political discord and to differing 
economic interest, a genuine dialogue and nego-
tiations on specific issues were bound to be ex-
ceedingly difficult, as witness the sixth special 
session of the United Nations General Assembly 
held in 1974. By the end of the seventh special 
session, held a year later, however, the earlier 
despondency had yielded to a new optimism. 
The confrontation of the sixth special session 
had given way to co-operation at the seventh, and 
to a set of negotiated objectives involving a larger 
degree of agreement than that achieved in the 
first decade after the establishment of UNCTAD. 
In the intervening year between the two special 
sessions some far-reaching attitudinal changes 
had taken place. The developed countries had 
come to the conclusion that the demands for a 
new international economic order should not be 
dismissed out of hand, that an accommodation of 
policies could carry with it important benefits 
for the industrialized world. The developing 
countries had agreed that confrontation had its 
limitations; that results could only be achieved on 
the basis of more moderate —some would say 
more realistic— proposals. The seventh special 
session had been carefully prepared, the parties 
having recognized that its deliberations should 
concentrate on well-defined priority topics. A 
broad consensus was reached at the seventh 
special session. The issue, when the session 
closed, was no longer so much what was to be 
done, as how it was to be done. 
After the seventh special session, and at 
the invitation of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then 
President of the French Republic, diplomacy 
regarding a new order shifted to Paris and to the 
Conference on International Economic 
Co-operation (CIEC). Originally conceived as an 
energy conference where the Western 
oil-importing States would negotiate with the 
OPEC countries, CIEC became instead a vehicle for 
a much more comprehensive North-South 
dialogue. This transformation was attributable to 
the Third World's determination to use OPEC 
leverage in order to compel action on matters 
of interest to non-oil-producing developing 
countries and to forestall Western efforts to split 
the OPEC States from their less affluent partners 
in the Group of 77. 
The Paris Conference was held outside of 
the United Nations framework and, in marked 
contrast to the universality which characterizes-
the United Nations, had only 27 participants (19 
from developing countries —eight from OPEC 
and 11 others— and eight, including the Eu-
ropean Economic Community as one unit, from 
developed countries). This experiment with 
high-level dialogue in a limited-membership 
forum about the future of the international 
economic order seemed for a time to challenge 
both the role of the United Nations and the 
solidarity of the Group of 77. However, in spite 
of its allegedly advantageous structural features, 
and in part because of them, CIEC proved to be as 
cumbersome as any United Nations or UNCTAD 
conference —quite ill-suited to deal with its 
formidable task. In the end it collapsed without 
significant agreement. 
At CIEC it became readily apparent that the 
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Group of 77 would insist on holding the Paris 
Group of 19 accountable to the larger, United 
Nations-based caucus of developing countries, 
and after the Conference development di-
plomacy returned to the United Nations 
framework in New York. Nonetheless, CIEC was 
perhaps the first serious discussion of develop-
ment issues by high-level policy makers. It was 
the first time that, in addition to Ministers from 
developing countries, the United States Secre-
tary of State, the British Foreign Secretary and 
others took off their jackets and held night-long 
sessions arguing about commodities, monetary 
reform, energy and related issues. For at least a 
brief period, something close to a real dialogue 
took place. The lessons of CIEC are, if only for that 
reason, not all negative. 
After the collapse of CIEC, much of the atten-
tion of the international community was directed 
to simply keeping the dialogue alive, CIEC had 
clearly demonstrated that the optimism gener-
ated by the seventh special session of the General 
Assembly had been premature, and that very 
serious divisions remained between developed 
and developing countries on most issues. 
The Paris Conference had contributed to the 
elucidation of many key issues. Each of the four 
CIEC Commissions (energy, raw materials, de-
velopment and finance) was able to reach some 
agreement at a very general level. In addition, a 
limited "Special Action Programme" of resource 
transfers was agreed to; the idea of constituting a 
common fund for stabilizing prices of some raw 
material exports was accepted in principle; and 
donor States pledged higher levels of official de-
velopment assistance. However, the extent of 
consensus was modest and very little progress 
was made on energy questions, the dominant 
concern of most industrialized countries. In-
deed, the energy issue was not thoroughly 
discussed and the developing countries refused 
to agree to continue a dialogue between 
producers and consumers of oil unless this was 
accompanied by parallel discussions of other 
issues. 
Institutionally, CIEC demonstrated that the 
United Nations much maligned negotiating pro-
cesses may not be as bad as had been claimed. 
Many people had said that deliberations could 
not be conducted in a effective fashion in this 
aeropagus of nations. In practice, the discussions 
in Paris very much resembled those in New York 
and Geneva, being modelled, in all essential re-
spects, on well established United Nations prac-
tices. The thesis that the North-South dialogue is 
vitiated by the United Nations setting was cer-
tainly not confirmed by the CIEC experience. It 
merely confirmed the view that the stumbling-
block lies elsewhere. 
In December of 1976, the 31st regular 
session of the United Nations General Assembly 
was suspended rather than adjourned in order to 
await the outcome of the Paris Conference. 
When the session was resumed in September of 
1977, the status of the North-South dialogue was 
naturally a central focus of attention. But the 
deadlock which had been inherited from CIEC: 
was not resolved during the resumed 31st 
session, nor indeed during the ensuing 32nd 
session. The major product of the Assembly's 
efforts was a carefully negotiated compromise 
between the Group of 77 and the developed 
countries on the subject of future negotiations. It 
was agreed that another special session of the 
General Assembly would be convened in 1980 
for the purpose of assessing progress on the NIEO 
and adopting a new development strategy for the 
1980s. The Assembly established a Committee of 
the Whole to monitor progress with respect to 
NIEO issues. The Committee began its substantive 
sessions in May of 1978, but its members were 
sharply divided over the nature of its mandate, 
and the Committee made very little headway in 
resolving the deadlock. 
In large measure, the absence of progress 
reflected the existence of a serious conflict be-
tween the real or perceived interests of de-
veloped and developing countries. The former 
were not unexpectedly reluctant to make any 
substantial economic concessions at a time when 
they were themselves suffering from spiralling 
inflation, recession, and persistent unemploy-
ment, particularly when high and rising energy 
costs jeopardized their ability to deal with these 
adversities. The issues of oil supply and oil prices 
were thus central to the deadlock; the Group of 77 
was unwilling to agree to a dialogue about energy 
unless it was preceded by progress on the central 
issues which constituted the agenda for the NIEO. 
The fact that the OPEC countries had their own 
priorities certainly did not make the situation any 
easier. 
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Efforts to break the North-South deadlock 
were also hampered by the level of generality at 
which policy initiatives were proposed and dis-
cussed. The ongoing dialogue did not, on the 
whole, show much promise of moving on to de-
tailed negotiations on specific issues. There were 
simply too many conflicts of interest —real or 
imagined— within and among the groups which 
were parties to the dialogue. Moreover, compet-
ing internal interests frequently produced near-
paralysis in the negotiating postures of some 
Although conflicting national interests presum-
ably constitute the crux of the deadlock, there are 
other important factors contributing to the stale-
mate between North and South. These factors 
might be termed the "institutional elements" of 
the deadlock, and they deserve some comment. 
The message of the seventh special session of 
the General Assembly had been that the Mem-
bers of the United Nations were willing to explore 
together the establishment of a new international 
economic order, although not necessarily what 
the developing countries advocated as the New 
International Economic Order. The demands of 
the developing States had indeed been trans-
formed into a set of broad objectives, and the 
focus of attention subsequently began to shift 
from "what to do" to "how to do it". There were, 
to be sure, reservations in some quarters about 
important aspects of the NIEO, but there was an 
agreement in principle that this was a legitimate 
agenda for further negotiation. Unfortunately, 
the question "how to do it" became in large 
measure a question of the appropriate in-
stitutional framework for negotiating the details 
of a new order which had been sketched at the 
sixth and seventh special sessions of the Assem-
bly. 
Disagreement over the appropr ia te in-
st i tut ional f ramework is i l lustrated by the 
relationship between UNCTAD and CIEC during 
the mid-1970s. UNCTAD Iv in Nairobi was in many 
governments, making it very difficult for their 
representatives to bargain seriously. The 
deadlock was further complicated by conflicting 
views about the appropriate institutional forums 
for considering specific issues. Those views were 
shaped by the sensitivity of governments to the 
realities of national power and influence, and by 
the desire of governments to channel 
negotiations into forums where their leverage 
was greatest. 
respects a failure. That failure can be attributed, 
in large measure, to the general hostility of the 
majority of developed countries to UNCTAD as a 
setting for concrete negotiations. In the view of 
some developed countries, were the Nairobi 
session to end in complete disaster, developing 
countries would virtually be compelled to turn to 
CIEC. However, the failure at Nairobi was not so 
decisive as to give rise to a broadly-based 
consensus that the Paris Conference must 
succeed. 
Several key officials within UNCTAD per-
ceived CIEC as a threat to UNCTAD'Í institutional 
interests. It was considerations such as this that 
accounted for an ambitious effort within UNCTAD 
—the Integrated Programme for Commodities, 
with its centrepiece, the Common Fund. It was 
hoped that this initiative would strengthen the 
role of UNCTAD in the negotiations about the New 
International Economic Order and, conversely, 
demonstrate the irrelevance of CIEC. Various 
scholars and political leaders have viewed 
UNCTAD'S decision to concentrate on the in-
ternational trade in commodities as a mistake for 
the developing world, but it should be noted that 
UNCTAD officials probably had no plausible 
alternative to a major initiative, given the in-
stitutional constraints inherent in UNCTAD and its 
position within the United Nations system. 
UNCTAD'S Secretary-General, Gamani Corea, had 
a strong intellectual interest in the idea, which 
IV 
Institutional elements of the deadlock 
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had its roots in the early work of John Maynard 
Keynes, but more important was the fact that 
commodities clearly fell within UNCTAD'Sjurisdic-
tion. However difficult it might be to establish an 
effective commodity programme of benefit to 
the developing world, the reasoning was that the 
purpose of strengthening UNCTAD as an institu-
tion would be well served. T h e principal defect of 
this strategy, according to critics, was that the 
developing countries had been induced to put all 
their eggs in one basket. The initial lack of pro-
gress in negotiations on the Integrated Pro-
gramme and the Common Fund exasperated 
many governments of developing countries, and 
as a consequence the deadlock became more in-
extricable. 
With the Paris Conference also under way, 
the "new order" negotiating process was severely 
complicated. Parallel negotiations, conducted in 
different settings and influenced by different in-
stitutional interests, were taking place con-
currently. They were, however, proceeding on 
different tracks, and at different speeds, CIEC was 
viewed as the "express train", while UNCTAD'S 
work on the Common Fund was the slower "local 
train". Progress at CIEC was almost certainly 
impeded by awareness of (and, in some cases, 
preference for) the alternative forum, and, at a 
minimum, efforts to make the North-South 
dialogue more concrete, direct and rational were 
inhibited. At UNCTAD IV, on the other hand, there 
was some reluctance to board the slow train when 
it could be argued that a fast train (CIEC) was 
coming. In the event, the fast train broke down. 
As noted earlier, the failure of CIEC led to 
an attempt to resume the dialogue within the 
United Nations framework in New York, specifi-
cally in the Committee of the Whole. Subsequent 
lack of progress in this new forum was also influ-
enced by institutional factors. Indeed, the very 
creation of the Committee of the Whole, with a 
mandate to provide impetus to develop-
ment-oriented negotiations, was a product of the 
reluctance to use the existing forums, ECOSOC 
and UNCTAD. The quest for the appropriate 
forum continued —a quest bedevilled by 
mutual suspicion, efforts at institutional 
aggrandizement, false starts, and missed 
opportunities. Nor was the rivalry between the 
New York and Geneva-based institutions 
calculated to advance progress in the Committee 
of the Whole. The Committee was never really 
given clear terms of reference that might have 
given it a certain standing by defining its purpose 
and functions. It was intended to act as a clearing 
house of ideas, to help in settling difficulties in 
negotiations and to encourage the continuing 
work in other forums of the United Nations 
system. It was never made very clear, however, 
how it was to perform this function of giving 
impetus to the negotiations. 
Such ambiguity left the Committee open to 
frequent charges that it sought to go too far, that 
it was impinging on the jurisdiction of other in-
stitutions better equipped for the negotiation of 
elements of a new order than the Committee. 
Ironically, the Committee's critics included de-
fenders of both UNCTAD and the IMP, i.e., in-
stitutions of which the former is perceived as the 
preferred vehicle of the developing countries 
and the latter that of developed countries. Both 
institutions were challenged by the creation of 
the Committee of the Whole and by the more 
ambitious prescriptions for its role. The Com-
mittee wanted to define its principal function as 
that of breaking the deadlock and stimulating 
movement across the board on the NIEO, leaving 
the negotiation of details to other bodies, such as 
UNCTAD in the case of the Common Fund and the 
IMP on monetary reforms. But UNCTAD saw its 
own function in much broader terms, and the t Mi-
resented the implication that the United Nations 
could or shou ld u n d e r t a k e to def ine in-
ternational monetary policy. 
The Committee of the Whole was perhaps 
destined to fail in its efforts to break the NIEO 
deadlock. As long as UNCTAD'S behaviour was 
seen by the industrialized countries as that of a 
trade union, it was totally unacceptable as the 
principal forum for the North-South dialogue. 
On the other hand, many developing countries 
in search of a post-cirx: vehicle for action on the 
NIEO felt that the Committee could function as a 
New York version of UNCTAD, relying on the 
allegedly greater political leverage in New York. 
Yet, even though both sides had coinciding in-
terests in creating a Committee of the Whole, 
they disagreed sharply on its role as a negotiating 
forum. In effect, the Committee remained an 
essentially hollow shell until finally, in 1980, it 
found its role as a preparatory committee for the 
global round of negotiations. 
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Unfortunately, the Committee was also un-
successful in that role. Charged with producing 
an agenda, procedures, and a time frame for 
global negotiations, the Committee came up 
against fundamental disagreements between the 
Group of 77 and several of the key industrialized 
countries. Finally, in June of 1980, the Com-
mittee broke down, conceding its inability to re-
concile conflicting viewpoints. 
The story told above illustrates a disturbing 
feature of the multilateral diplomacy carried on 
between the developing and developed worlds: 
the continuing tendency to resort to the creation 
of new (and, some would argue, unnecessary) 
institutions in response to the frustrations of 
deadlocked negotiations. The wisdom of estab-
lishing the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, the World Food Council, and the Inter-
governmental Committee on Science and Tech-
nology for Development, among others, was fre-
quently questioned by one or another group of 
countries. It is not suggested that these "new" 
institutions do not perform useful tasks; indeed, 
they may reinforce sectoral approaches to de-
velopment. Moreover, institutional competition 
may at times improve performance. The resulting 
web of organizations is, however, evidence of an 
unplanned, ad hoc approach to development and 
to the reordering of multilateral economic rela-
tions. 
This proliferation of bodies has been noted, 
but so far not very effectively addressed, by 
Members of the United Nations. Indeed, while 
they have indulged a penchant for creating new 
institutions and fragmenting the global effort to 
reform the international economic order, tenta-
tive steps have also been taken toward the re-
structuring of the United Nations system to make 
it "fully capable of dealing with problems of in-
ternational economic co-operation in a compre-
hensive manner". This restructuring effort, 
which produced a controversial report by a 
group of experts in 1975 and later a report from 
an intergovernmental committee on restructur-
ing —which was unanimously accepted by the 
General Assembly— was intended to introduce 
cohesion, to streamline, and to improve the man-
agement of the United Nations system. Unfortu-
nately, the pace of restructuring has slowed and 
reforms have not yet been undertaken. 
The explanation for the failure to proceed 
vigorously in this context can be found in the 
resistance of vested interests and inertia, and, to 
some extent, in the fact that restructuring has 
been linked to substantive progress towards the 
new international economic order. Different ele-
ments within the United Nations view that rela-
tionship differently, and for the time being the 
urgently needed rationalization of the United 
Nations system's economic and social sectors is 
not occurring. T h e relationship between the 
New York and Geneva wings of the United Na-
tions has not been addressed, nor have the rela-
tionships between the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies. T h e deficiencies in the op-
eration of ECOSOC have been acknowledged but 
not cured. T h e institutional context for the 
North-South dialogue is still flawed. 
One important aspect of the restructuring 
process relates to the international secretariat. 
The blame for the propensity of governments to 
opt for new institutions has been attributed by 
some to international officials, who have been 
viewed as too passive and, except for UNCI AD, 
•insufficiently committed to the agenda of inter-
national economic reform. Many of the develop-
ing countries in particular have long been dis-
satisfied with what they regard as an absence of 
creative thinking and leadership in the United 
Nations Secretariat. Even more basically, in con-
trast to the wide acclaim formerly accorded to 
United Nations' reports and studies, recent sup-
port documents produced by the Secretariat 
have been widely criticized for their lack of rele-
vance and utility. A steady flow of ideas and 
proposals from the Secretariat could well be of 
considerable value in developing a strategy for 
breaking the North-South deadlock. Restructur-
ing was intended to create the conditions for such 
Secretariat initiatives. The new post of Director-
General for Development and International Eco-
nomic Co-operation was conceived as a focal 
point for a comprehensive, system-wide effort on 
behalf of international economic reform. 
Admittedly, the Secretariat found itself in 
the awkward position of being expected to pro-
vide support concurrently for two processes —on 
the one hand for the NIEO dialogue and negotia-
tions and, on the other, for the formulation of a 
new development strategy for the 1980s. These 
processes should have been complementary, but 
in fact they were frequently competitive and con-
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flictual. The formulation of the new develop-
ment strategy was at first delayed while officials 
awaited progress on the NIEO. Since, however, 
the progress on the NIEO did not materialize, by 
late 1977 the United Nations had to consider how 
to reconcile the development strategy with the 
plan for global negotiations. In the circum-
stances, it proved necessary to proceed with both, 
with the focus of the strategy on setting targets 
without waiting for decisions from the global 
round of negotiations, which was to have been 
launched in 1980. Some observers suspected that 
the Western countries wanted to emphasize the 
strategy in order to create the illusion of progress 
and to divert attention from the NIEO. Be that as it 
may, the United Nations found itself engaged in 
two important exercises whose interrelationship 
was poorly defined. 
Another institutional element contributing 
to the deadlock has been the emphasis on main-
taining unity among the diverse elements which 
make up the Group of 77 on the one hand, and 
the Western countries on the other. The desir-
ability of group unity is generally acknowledged, 
but unfortunately that unity has often been pre-
served at the expense of specificity in proposals 
and responses. When the so-called like-minded 
Western countries adopt a more responsive posi-
tion on specific NIEO demands, their posture may 
create the illusion of progress and even discour-
age the discussion of trade-offs and comprom-
ises. When raised expectations are dashed, ill-will 
ensues. Not only does the situation make inter-
group negotiations difficult; it also discourages 
ministerial participation in the negotiating pro-
cess, and hence the negotiators lack the leverage 
necessary for achieving significant break-
throughs. 
Where the developed countries are pre-
pared to make concessions and progress is dis-
cernible (see the example of the Common Fund 
negotiations), the symbolic importance of soli-
darity is less important than the pragmatic quest 
for economic benefits. Still, the Group of 77 will 
not lightly abandon its hard-won solidarity, for it 
fears that the developed countries may pursue a 
"divide and rule" strategy. In the past, unity has 
been a political necessity for the Group of 77. 
Nevertheless, rigid concepts of group unity will 
necessarily disappear as negotiations become 
more concrete and the diverse interests of the 
members of the Group begin to surface. A sense 
of priorities will then emerge, and, if movement 
can then be achieved on priority items, the end of 
the deadlock may be in sight. 
Another institutional element which should 
be noted is the negotiating process itself. The 
sheer numbers of participants in this process 
have been a complicating factor at times, strain-
ing the capacities of institutions designed for 
consciousness raising, but not for negotiating. 
The United Nations has been under pressure to 
discover techniques which allow for universality 
of participation, thereby avoiding one of the ma-
jor problems of CIEC, while at the same time en-
couraging the dynamics of small group interac-
tion which are necessary for substantive prog-
ress. It can be argued that "numbers" are not an 
insuperable obstacle; there are more than 150 
sovereign States in the United Nations, and one 
has to accept and come to terms with this fact of 
international life. Experience has shown, howev-
er, that "numbers" are not a serious impediment 
in cases where there is a genuine willingness to 
modify positions, i.e., to engage in serious bar-
gaining. A sense of movement in negotiations 
contributes to the willingness of delegates to rely 
on small contact groups. At the seventh special 
session, a few negotiators in effect represented 
150 delegations in discussions of the six priority 
items. This kind of situation has sometimes been 
encouraged by holding negotiations in small, 
even uncomfortable meeting rooms. So long as 
participation is not formally restricted to certain 
representatives, in other words so long as all 
States may claim to have been involved in the 
process, the criticims levelled against the CIEC: can 
be avoided. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that fully effective 
rules and procedures for negotiations in the area 
of international economic policy have not yet 
been elaborated. A conscious effort will have to 
be made to devise such rules and procedures, 
and the United Nations may have to look beyond 
its own institutions for useful models and prac-
tices which might be adapted to its own needs. 
A final institutional element in the deadlock 
should be noted, although it cannot be explored 
in any detail here. Unlike the others, which are 
international in character, this one is national: 
the difficulties faced by governments in formu-
lating coherent policies and in co-ordinating the 
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attitudes and positions of their various minis-
tries. Indeed, as note earlier, many of the institu-
tional handicaps which affect multilateral di-
plomacy are simply the reflection of institutional 
tangles at the national level. It is no secret that in 
many cases different ministries hold different 
conceptions of the national interest in connection 
with international negotiations in different 
forums. Foreign ministries and finance minis-
tries can often be counted on to view the same 
issues differently. Other ministries, such as those 
concerned with development and agriculture, 
also express independent views. The task for 
governments, therefore, is to establish internal 
mechanisms and procedures for formulating 
national positions and proposals which take 
account of divergent interests and serve dif-
ferent constituencies without being hopelessly 
general. 
The consequence of the multiplicity and di-
versity of national interests is that not infrequent-
ly delegations representing the same govern-
The predominant mood among those who have 
been actively engaged in the North-South dia-
logue is sombre, if not gloomy, CIEC ended in 
failure, and subsequent efforts of a like nature 
within the United Nations have not been more 
successful. T h e Committee of the Whole expired 
quietly in 1980, leaving almost no mark, and the 
eleventh special session of the General Assembly, 
which was to have launched the global nego-
tiations that would culminate in the restructuring 
of the international economic order, could not 
agree on the agenda, procedures and time frame 
for those negotiations. Meanwhile, recent 
UNCTAD and UNIDO conferences in Manila and 
New Delhi respectively were widely acknowl-
edged to have failed in their efforts to impart a 
decisive momentum to the North-South 
dialogue. Indeed, those two institutions, long 
identified with the aspirations of developing 
countries, are struggling to sustain their roles 
ment in different negotiating contexts do not 
speak with one voice. On altogether too many 
occasions a minister of development will take a 
position within the context of UNCTAD negotia-
tions which is at variance with the position taken 
by the government within GATT, FAO or the IMF, 
where different delegates, representing dif-
rent interests, present the government's brief. 
This inconsistency has at time added to the con-
flict between New York and Geneva, as well as to 
tensions between the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies. It is obvious that efforts to 
conduct orderly and productive negotiations are 
hindered by such situations, particularly when so 
many of the 150-odd delegations are plagued by 
the same internal conflicts. 
Despite the difficulties posed by these insti-
tutional elements of the North-South deadlock, 
there is reason to be guardedly optimistic about 
the future of the NIEO. It is to this potential for a 
break in the deadlock that we shall now turn our 
attention. 
within the larger system. Economic troubles in 
the Western world have led to the adoption of 
more conservative approaches and policies, and 
a renewal of East-West tensions seems to be 
pushing the North-South dialogue aside. 
Those rushing to write the obituary for the 
NIEO will, however, be proved wrong. In spite of 
the disappointments and frustrations of recent 
years, there is good reason for guarded opti-
mism. A closer look at recent trends, both sub-
stantive and institutional, suggests that some 
progress has been made and that the conditions 
for further progress exist. Although the general 
realization that the deadlock must be broken 
does not guarantee that it will be broken, it is 
fitting that this essay should close with some com-
ments on possible reforms that might facilitate a 
breakthrough. 
First, however, it should be noted that the 
interests of virtually all State —both within the 
V 
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developing world and between the developing 
and developed nations— are sufficiently in-
terrelated to make a breakthrough in North-
South negotiations logical. Some would argue 
that such a breakthrough is in fact inevitable, and 
that what we are witnessing in the present 
deadlock is the lag which often occurs between 
the launching of apparently radical new ideas 
and their subsequent acceptance after they have 
become more familiar and less threatening. This 
is a familiar theme in multilateral diplomacy. 
Raúl Prebisch favoured the tactic of pushing 
ideas before their time; he knew that it would 
take a while before they could be translated into 
action, but he also understood that the delay 
would be even longer without early efforts to 
launch such ideas. 
Viewed in this light, the present deadlock is 
but a stage in a protracted process, frustrating to 
be sure, but not cause for despair or for the 
termination of the dialogue. However slow the 
process, it will lead to a greater acknowledg-
ment of interdependence and hence to real 
bargaining. The United States, which is relatively 
more self-sufficient than most OECD States, im-
ports such vast quantities of goods that global 
negotiations will ultimately serve its interests 
almost as much as they are expected to benefit 
most Third World nations. The Europeans are 
already more interested in global negotiations 
than is the United State because their needs are 
more acute. This difference was apparent during 
the eleventh special session, when the United 
States was preoccupied with an election leading 
to a change in administration, allowing the Eu-
ropean Community to display more flexibility on 
the most controversial issue —the challenge 
posed by the United Nations to the authority of 
the International Monetary Fund. Although 
there is, of course, no groundswell of support 
within the F.EC for the United Nations becoming 
a vehicle for international monetary reform, 
the Europeans have seemed somewhat more 
willing than the United States to find at least the 
language of accommodation. 
In the meanwhile, the system and its mem-
bers have displayed a capacity for adaptation 
which must be regarded as encouraging. One 
could even argue that the United States, which 
has most vigorously resisted some of the reforms 
sought by the developing countries, was in fact 
one of the first champions of a new order. 
Washington signalled its commitment to change 
as early as 1971 when it acted to set aside some 
of the Bretton Woods rules: an event which 
suggests that IMF reforms, now so widely demand-
ed, really began in 1971. In fact, for all of the 
criticisms levelled at the IMF by developing 
countries and the very substantial agenda of un-
finished business, the Fund has not been 
unresponsive to pressures for change. It has 
established a number of special facilities 
designed primarily for the benefit of developing 
countries, and has reformed the operation of one 
of these, the Compensatory Financing Facility, in 
a variety of ways which enhance its value to those 
countries. The Executive Board has been 
enlarged to accommodate the special role of 
Saudi Arabia as one of the two largest creditor 
members and the participation of the People's 
Republic of China. Moreover, the Fund has 
finally acknowledged the structural character of 
developing countries' balance-of-payments 
deficits. 
These change do not, however, overhaul the 
outdated quota system, nor do they satisfactorily 
deal with the troublesome issue of conditionality. 
Yet, within those constraints which cause the 
Group of 77 to view it as an "old order" in-
stitutions, the IMF is trying with some measure of 
success to demonstrate that it is flexible and re-
sponsive to the demands of a changing in-
ternational order. 
The GATT, too, has shown a certain capacity 
for adjustment. Although the Tokyo Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations was deeply dis-
appointing to developing countries on several 
counts, it demonstrated that the Contracting 
Parties have now officially embraced the princi-
ple of non-reciprocity in trade relations between 
developed and developing countries, which is 
central to the NIEO, and one of the principal aims 
advocated by UNCTAD. The pace of change within 
the GATT framework is not dramatic, but the 
incremental and inadequate character of reform 
may be less important in the longer run than the 
evidence that even the so-called "rich man's 
club" can bend its rules to accommodate some 
elements of a new order. 
Instances of institutional adaptation are to be 
found on every hand. For example, the In-
ternational Fund for Agricultural Development 
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(IFAD), a new United Nations specialized agency 
created in 1977, takes a significant step away 
from "old order" habits and toward "new order" 
realities by explicitly recognizing the role of oil-
exporting countries in us governing body. It also 
exemplifies a creative impulse in a controversial 
area of the NIEO, multilateral decision-making, 
by adopting a tripartite system of membership 
and leaving to each of the three groups of States 
—developing countries, OECD States, and OPEC 
States— the decision as to how to allocate votes 
within the group. A willingness to be flexible with 
respect to participation and decision-making is 
also visible in the agreement reached in UNCTAD 
in June of 1980 on a Common Fund ; that agree-
ment reflectes accommodation by both de-
veloped and developing countries, resulting in a 
formula which uses neither the United Nations 
nor IMF/World Bank as its model. 
T h e long and difficult negotiations in the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea broke important new ground in several 
areas. One of the most significant of these new 
departures was the acceptance for the first time 
in international law of the concept of consensus 
and its definition in the text of the Convention 
("the absence of formal objection"). Consensus 
has been advocated by the developed countries 
for many years, and has been informally em-
ployed in lieu or formal voting in many multi-
lateral forums. Developing countries, conscious 
of the advantages which their numerical majority 
gives them, had hitherto been loath to encourage 
the institutionalization of decision by consensus, 
but it would appear that they modified that posi-
tion in UNCLOS. Moreover, the Authority which is 
to be established to make the important decisions 
regarding the exploitation of the seabed is to be 
governed by principles and rules of participation 
and voting which are generally consistent with 
the ethos of the new order; the complex decision-
making system is a monument to the per-
severance of negotiators and their willingness to 
experiment with new formulae for this pre-
cedent-setting international instrument. 
Indeed, UNCLOS has already added sub-
stantially to the lore of international negotia-
tions, giving us a vade mecum of negotiating tactics 
to use and to avoid in the interest of reaching 
agreement on NiEo-type issues. 
These are but a few of the adaptations 
the United Nations, which dominated the 
occurring within the United Nations system 
which suggest that its institutions are not immuta-
bly fixed in their rules or practices and that 
member States are not irretrievably rigid or in-
flexible. The institutional agenda for the near 
future is a demanding one, but as these instances 
of adaptability suggest, it is not impossible. What 
is now required? 
The most important requirement is that all 
States should be persuaded that the objectives of 
the new order are in their national interest. In 
the short term, it is obvious that virtually every 
element of the NIEO confronts at least some States 
with some hard choices. In the longer run, 
however, all States —developing and developed 
alike— will benefit from the changes contem-
plated by the NIEO and from the more balanced 
and equitable system of international relations 
which would result from its realization. 
Enlightened self-interest, therefore, acknowl-
edges interdependence and dictates policies 
which seek orderly development, economically 
secure nations in all regions, strong trading 
partners, and the confident exercise of 
sovereignty by States over their own resources 
and economic planning. 
Another requirement is that the somewhat 
artificial conflict between the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies should be resolved. The 
Group of 77 has tended to insist upon the pri-
macy of the United Nations in the negotiation of 
the NIEO; some of the developed countries, led 
most vigorously by the United States, have 
resisted efforts to give the United Nations a right 
of review (and reversal) of issues traditionally 
within the purview of the specialized agencies. It 
is clear that a middle ground is needed between 
these positions, that the United Nations cannot 
assume the role the Group of 77 has claimed for 
it, but that neither can the agenda of new order 
issues be left to a business-as-usual approach in a 
host of unreconstructed specialized forums. The 
United Nations' logical function is to provide a 
sense of direction as well as political impetus in 
the realm of global economic reform, and to 
ensure as much coherence as possible in the 
decentralized United Nations system. It cannot 
and should not pre-empt the functions of the 
specialized agencies; ultimately they must do the 
job in their own areas of competence. 
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Thus the debate over the paramount role of 
eleventh special session and effectively halted 
efforts to launch global negotiations, is in-
creasingly sterile. No government today denies 
that the United Nations is vital to the process of 
international economic reform, and that it has an 
important legitimising function. But insistence 
on institutionalizing that role tends to obscure 
the need to introduce reforms and modify the 
rules and procedures of many bodies in the 
United Nations system. 
Foremost among these is the IMF. AS we have 
noted, the Fund has been undergoing change, 
albeit slowly, in a direction which will benefit the 
developing countries. That process of reform 
must continue, especially in the controversial 
areas of conditionality and quotas, and pressure 
from the United Nations may be able to help 
create a climate of opinion in which reform is 
perceived to be both necessary and urgent. 
Ironically, one of the reforms most often 
cited in discussions of the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions —greater participation by developing 
countries in the decision-making process— may 
not be so critical. The growing practice of resort-
ing to decision by consensus may have made this 
something of an artificial issue. At the same time 
it is true that there are numerous other areas 
within the United Nations system where further 
adaptation of rules and procedures is urgently 
needed and where obstacles of structure and 
habit and expectation will not be easy to over-
come. UNCTAD, which has sought a central role in 
the NIEO negotiating process and is now ex-
periencing something of an identity crisis, must 
reevaluate its function. The establishment by the 
Group of 77 of its own substantive support 
mechanisms —as decided upon at the recent 
"South-South" Conference in Caracas— will 
facilitate that process. The prominence of tech-
nology issues is of importance to UNESCO, which 
must prepare itself for an expanding agenda. 
UNIDO must digest the lessons of its nearly 
disastrous conference in New Delhi and its sub-
sequent retreat from the confrontation over the 
proposal for establishing a huge industrial de-
velopment fund. 
One of the most vital of these institutional 
reforms falls under the rubric of restructuring. 
As the United Nations system has grown and as 
its components have gone their separate ways, 
the system has become fragmented. Whereas 
some division of labour is obviously desirable, the 
present disarray is surely excessive and even 
counterproductive. Developing countries have a 
stake in restructuring because it would con-
tribute to a more integrated approach to de-
velopment and because, with a more rational 
and streamlined United Nations system, their 
limited resources would go further. Developed 
countries, as the major financial supporters of 
the United Nations system, would also benefit 
from the increased efficiency which 
restructuring would presumably bring. The 
restructuring process, begun with much fanfare, 
must be invested with new life and efforts will 
have to be made to expand its scope to the 
relationships between New York and Geneva 
and between the United Nations itself and other 
institutions of its system. 
The issue of participation also needs to be 
addressed. Some countries are conspicuously un-
der-involved in the search for a new order, es-
pecially the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries as well as the more affluent of the OPKC 
States. The international community will have to 
find ways of enlisting these States more fully and 
effectively in global negotiations and in action to 
cure some of the fundamental economic ills from 
which the developing world is suffering. 
Equally important to the success of the 
North-South dialogue is bureaucratic lead-
ership. Global negotiations require a much more 
forceful and a more imaginative and creative 
input from international secretariats. It was on 
the basis of ideas first mooted in international 
bureaucracies that some of the most important 
steps in multilateral economic co-operation were 
taken in the early post-war years and again in the 
watershed period of the late 1950s and early 
1960s. There is no reason why this tradition 
should not be continued or revived where it has 
fallen into desuetude. Bureaucratic leadership 
will not come easily, however. Organizational 
trends have not favoured the assertion of such 
leadership, and the political climate adds an el-
ement of risk for international officials with a 
creative bent of mind. The requisite skills are 
there, however, and restructuring, properly 
conceived and carried out, can help to bring 
them into play. Governments must be persuaded 
that their interests are served by raising standards 
INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS OF A NEW DIPLOMACY FOR DEVELOPMENT / Diego Cordovez 43 
and expectations where the international civil 
service is concerned. 
In spite of several false starts, the in-
ternational community is edging inexorably to-
ward global negotiations, i.e., negotiations lead-
ing to a broadly approved statement of intent 
reflecting agreement among States as to the ma-
jor elements of a global compact, mutualiy ben-
Much lip service is paid to the concept of in-
terdependence, and the term itself has become 
controversial. Nevertheless, the term accurately 
characterizes the world situation. No nation-
State can escape the logic of interdependence, 
the United States or Belgium no more than Tan-
zania or Bangladesh. The new diplomacy for 
development is, in effect, the diplomacy of in-
terdependence. 
This new diplomacy is by now well es-
tablished and thoroughly familiar to its prac-
titioners. It has helped to create an increased 
awareness of the nature and scope of all that 
development implies and of the positions and 
tactics of the leading protagonists. It has also 
produced some tangible results which look in-
significant only when compared with the size of 
the remaining task. As noted at the beginning of 
this essay, there can be no turning back the clock 
to the d ip lomacy which charac ter ized in-
ternational economic relations before UNCTAD 
appeared on the scene in 1964. The new di-
plomacy is not, however, immutable. Indeed, it is 
eficial to developing and developed States alike. 
Such an agreement will be but the beginning, not 
the end, of a long process. Subsequent negotia-
tions in specialized forums will be necessary to 
work out the details. It is not inconceivable, given 
trends which indicate some convergence of pre-
viously polarized positions, that global negotia-
tions could produce decisions on specific issues. 
only if its flaws are acknowledged and adjust-
ments made that the United Nations system will 
be able to play the role in which it has been cast. 
Some of these adjustments are identified in 
the preceding pages. Three ofthem are so vital to 
the prospects of the NIEO that they should be 
underscored in conclusion: 
— the need for all countries to perceive the 
objectives of the new international economic 
order from the standpoint of enlightened 
self-interest; 
— the need to define the political role of the 
United Nations and the technical role of the 
specialized agencies in a way which would 
lead to more coherent action; and 
— the need for a more vigorous and creative 
leadership effort on development issues on 
the part of the United Nations system sec-
retariats. 
Once these needs are recognized and action 
is taken to respond to them, the new diplomacy 
will gain a new lease on life and the prospects of a 
better world order will be greatly enhanced. 
VI 
Conclusion 
